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Beside language, space is to date the most widely recognized lateralized systems. For
example, it has been shown that even mental representations of space and the spatial
representation of abstract concepts display lateralized characteristics. For the most part,
this body of literature describes space as distal or something outside of the observer
or actor. What has been strangely absent in the literature on the whole and specifically
in the spatial literature until recently is the most proximal space imaginable – the body.
In this review, we will summarize three strands of literature showing laterality in body
representations. First, evidence of hemispheric asymmetries in body space in health
and, second in body space in disease will be examined. Third, studies pointing to
differential contributions of the right and left hemisphere to illusory body (space) will be
summarized.Together these studies show hemispheric asymmetries to be evident in body
representations at the level of simple somatosensory and proprioceptive representations.
We propose a novel working hypothesis, whereby neural systems dedicated to processing
action-oriented information about one’s own body space may ontogenetically serve as a
template for the perception of the external world.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether we navigate through an unknown environment, cross a
busy street or give somebody directions by pointing to a location,
for most of us, parts of our right hemisphere will be active (e.g.,
Kinsbourne and Bemporad, 1984; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Craig, 2002; Vogel et al., 2003). Of course this does not mean that
the left hemisphere will be silent. Rather, in comparison to tasks
which involve more left-hemispheric functions such as language
(Grunwald et al., 2001), the spatial processing required during the
above examples recruits predominantly right lateralized circuits
(Stephan et al., 2007). Besides language, spatial processing is the
most widely recognized and best studied lateralized system in the
human brain (Gotts et al., 2013).
Lateralization for spatial processing is evident on three lev-
els. First, a behavioral index is provided by the level of success
with which spatial tasks are performed by people presumed to
be lateralized to a greater degree (i.e., right-handers) compared
to people with more bilateral functioning (i.e., mixed-handers
and some left-handers; Knecht et al., 2000; Szaflarski et al., 2002).
While handedness only constitutes an imperfect proxy for lat-
erality, the general finding is that spatial ability declines with
increasing dextrality (Annett, 2002; cf. Gotts et al., 2013). For
example, neurologically normal right-handers, but not mixed and
left-handers, typically misbisect a line to the left of true cen-
ter (Jewell and McCourt, 2000; cf. Scarisbrick et al., 1987) – a
small spatial bias termed “pseudoneglect” (Bowers and Heilman,
1980). Second, cerebral functioning studies provide evidence of
right hemispheric dominance for the processing of spatial tasks
(for a meta-analysis, see Vogel et al., 2003) and patients suffering
from right hemispheric damage exhibit marked spatial deficits
(Kerkhoff, 2001). Finally, a third level of laterality description is
that of macro- and microstructural differences between the right
and left hemisphere generally (e.g., Thiebaut de Schotten et al.,
2011), as well as between the corpus callosum of individuals later-
alized to a greater, and those to a lesser degree (e.g.,Witelson, 1985;
Habib et al., 1991; Jäncke and Steinmetz, 2003;Westerhausen et al.,
2004).
Both behavioral and functional studies are most often con-
cerned with visuospatial processing of external space. That is, by
far the greatest amount of knowledge on the laterality of spatial
processes concerns the visual modality and the perception of the
region of space that is within one’s reach (i.e., peripersonal space)
and the region of space outside of one’s reach (i.e., extrapersonal
space). However, it is also known that lateralization of spatial
processing extends to other modalities and even to the mental
representation of space and abstract concepts like numbers. Sim-
ilar to pseudoneglect for the visual variant of the line bisection
task, for example, haptic bisection also results in a systematic
bias in right-handers (Sampaio and Chokron, 1992; Brodie and
Dunn, 2005; Hach and Schütz-Bosbach, 2012) and mental repre-
sentations of space are frequently affected by a hemispatial bias in
patients suffering from visuospatial neglect (Bisiach and Luzzatti,
1978; Bartolomeo et al., 1994; Landi et al., 1997). As a result of
the focus on the visual modality, discussions and examinations
of representations of our own body, dominated by the tactile and
proprioceptive sense, are almost completely absent from the spatial
literature. Yet, our own body represents a crucial spatial compart-
ment and, in extension to peri- and extrapersonal space, may be
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conceptualized as a third region of space. It is this third region of
space that forms the main focus of the current review.
BODY SPACE
Body space is simply defined as the space that our own body inhab-
its. For the purpose of this review and the working hypothesis we
propose as part of the conclusion to this review, body space consti-
tutes a superordinate concept including at least two different body
representations that have beenproposed to exist in the past. Specif-
ically, the body schema, or a low-level egocentric, action-oriented
representation of one’s own body in terms of tactile and propri-
oceptive information (for various definitions of this concept, see
Head and Holmes, 1912; Haggard and Wolpert, 2005; Holmes
and Spence, 2006), forms an important part of body space. Sim-
ilarly, however, the body image may be seen as a part of body
space. Body image, here, refers to an abstract representation of
one’s own body that includes a conscious and emotional eval-
uation of the visual characteristics of the body (Paillard, 1999;
Gallagher, 2005). This representation is thought to be coherent
across space and time and, importantly, distinct from the body
schema (Paillard, 1999; Gallagher, 2005; Schwoebel and Coslett,
2005; Dijkerman and De Haan, 2007). In addition to the body
schema and the body image, other forms of body representations,
such as left-lateralized linguistically mediated representations,
have importantly been proposed to exist (e.g., Coslett et al., 2002;
Schwoebel and Coslett, 2005; Dijkerman and De Haan, 2007), but
are considered distinct from the current conceptualization of body
space.
Body space, including the different forms of representations
mentioned above, distinguishes itself from peri- and extraper-
sonal space with regard to two aspects. First, representations of
our own body are always immediate, inescapable and tied to the
first person perspective. That is, there is no possibility of separat-
ing oneself from body space – an observation recorded as early
as the late 1800s by James (1890). Second, interoception, or the
“sense of the physiological or homeostatic condition” of our own
body (Berlucchi and Aglioti, 2010, p. 31), provides a unique and
private source of information about the state of this space, that
is lacking for the perception of peri- and extrapersonal space.
There is extensive evidence showing interactions between body
space, peripersonal and extrapersonal space. Specifically it has
been shown that the border between what is perceived as within or
outside of one’s reach, or neck of the woods, is heavily dependent
on the representation of body space (e.g., Pavani and Castiello,
2004; Coello et al., 2008). However, it remains an empirical ques-
tion whether the aforementioned special characteristics of body
space mean that this third region of space can or cannot be sub-
sumed under the heading of spatial perception. In other words,
it is unclear whether general rules of spatial perception, specifi-
cally those applying to action-oriented egocentric representations
of space, also apply to the perception of body space.
One first, and admittedly crude, level of examining this is lat-
erality. Findings showing that body space perception, like that of
external space, is largely right-lateralized could be first evidence
that, although special with regard to the two points mentioned
above, body space can be subsumed under the supramodal head-
ing of spatial perception. In the following, we will summarize the
state of evidence of hemispheric asymmetries in body space rep-
resentation from three perspectives. First, body space in health
and second, body space in disease will be examined. Specifi-
cally, body space asymmetries in right-handers and twodescriptive
examples of disorders of body space, namely somatic neglect and
eating disorders, will illustrate the crucial contribution of the right
hemisphere to these representations. Third, studies pointing to
differential contributions of the right hemisphere to illusory body
space, using the example of the rubber hand illusion (RHI),will be
summarized. Examples from all three levels of description of lat-
erality, namely behavioral, functional, and structural studies will
be taken into account.
BODY SPACE IN HEALTH
Returning to the example of everyday spatial processing given
at the outset of this review, the area of navigation has pro-
vided some of the best-known literature on spatial processing
(e.g., Craig, 2002). Navigational experts like London taxi and bus
drivers are widely known to show greater posterior hippocam-
pal volume bilaterally. Right hippocampal volume, in particular,
correlates with the number of years of navigational expertise
(Wagner et al., 2003; Nico et al., 2010). It is also known that bilat-
eral hippocampal lesions lead to a loss of some of the flexibility
with which the navigational expertise acquired prior to injury
can be applied (Guardia et al., 2013). Most of these well-known
examples focus on navigational skills which require an abstract,
view-independent or allocentric representation of external
space.
A related line of research examines spatial processing from the
egocentric perspective, and has received comparatively little atten-
tion. Specifically, studies examining navigational behavior in rela-
tion to handedness have shown that healthy right-handers exhibit
a behavior similar to stroke victims suffering from neglect. While
it is common for right parietal lobe stroke victims to collide with
objects to their left when navigating through tight spaces (Tsakiris
et al., 2007a; Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2012), Turnball and McGe-
orge (1998) presented observational data showing the opposite
bias in healthy right-handers. That is, right-handers were found
to be more likely to collide with objects on their right. A series of
more recent studies has confirmed and extended this finding to
show that the extent to which right-handers display a leftward bias
on the classical line bisection task is significantly associated with
the number of rightward collisions (Nicholls et al., 2007, 2008b)
and that navigational displays viewed in the upper, but not the
lower, visual field result in a greater chance of rightward collisions
(Thomas et al., 2009).
While the authors of the above studies attributed the naviga-
tional bias in right-handers only to a biased perception of the
display provided (in most studies this is a narrow doorway or cor-
ridor), one additional factor that may act together with a biased
perception of the peri- and extrapersonal space as well as a host
of other factors (e.g., differential movements of the right and left
upper limbs, see Nicholls et al., 2007, 2008b) to produce lateral-
ized collisions has been left largely unexplored. It could be argued
that just as much as the perception of the external environment,
an accurate perception of where in space one’s own body is and
how wide/narrow it is in different places is required for this task.
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Thus, an additional contributing factor to right-handers’bumping
behavior could be a less precise perception of their own body. Due,
in part, to the scarcity of validated tests for the assessment of rep-
resentations of body space, this question has not been addressed
in depth until recently.
A few existing examinations of representations of body space
employ a task parallel to the traditional line bisection task. Here
participants are required to point to their body midline or to a
location ahead of themwhich correspondswith their bodymidline
(also termed subjective sagittal middle). Three studies examined
handedness differences in this task and report findings broadly
congruent with pseudoneglect. Spidalieri and Sgolastra (1997)
and Chokron et al. (2004) reported that right-handed participants
pointed significantly to the left of their midsagittal plane when
using their left hand, while another study found a significant bias
to the left for both right- and left-handers (Colliot et al., 2002).
Using this task it is not possible, however, to distinguish between a
bias affecting pointing actions and a spatial bias which affects the
representation of one’s own body. Further, a midsagittal pointing
task could be argued to draw less on a spatial representation of the
body as a whole.
A different task which is superior in that it requires many
body surface locations to be transformed into locations in exter-
nal space (cf. Yamamoto and Kitazawa, 2001) is the Fluff Test.
Here, a number of cotton balls are attached to the blindfolded
participant’s clothes. Subsequently, the participant is required
to recover these. Using this task, first evidence of a body space
bias in neurologically healthy right-handers beyond a pointing
bias such as that documented using the midsagittal pointing
task was found by Cocchini et al. (2001). For their validation
of the Fluff Test, which was aimed at assessing somatic neglect
in stroke patients, the authors also examined the performance
of a group of control participants. A trend toward handed-
ness differences was found with some left-handers outperforming
right-handers.
A more recent study conducted at our lab improved the sen-
sitivity of the Fluff Test by increasing the number of items to
be recovered from the body surface (Hach and Schütz-Bosbach,
2010). By using a tight-fitting full body suit equipped with the
stimuli that were to be recovered, some limitations such as the
potential of tactile feedback during the placement of the cotton
balls on the clothing of the participant were also removed. We con-
firmed the original trend and showed that right-handers generally
showed less exploration of their body surface in comparison to
left-handers. In line with studies reporting handedness differences
for cognitive domains as diverse as attention, decision making or
memory (e.g., Annett, 2002; Propper et al., 2005; Christman et al.,
2007b), we interpreted this as an indication of right-handers hav-
ing less access to right hemisphere processing. Functional access
in this case refers to the recruitment of specialized neural struc-
tures for performance on a task that is high on the demands of
this particular ability and “better functional access” results from
greater neural interconnectivity (higher number of white mat-
ter tracts/synapses; He et al., 2007). Further, when biomechanical
constraints were taken into account, a particular advantage for the
right (or disadvantage for the left) side of the body seemed to be
present for this group of participants.
Moreover, we also introduced a quantitative measure of the
putative body space bias, the Body Outline Pointing Task (Hach
and Schütz-Bosbach, 2010). This measure requires participants
to point to the widest and narrowest part of their hidden body
on their right and their left side in three locations. A comparison
of participants’ pointing scores for the left and right hemispace
can be used to determine a side bias. In addition, a more pre-
cise measure of participants’ ability to judge the actual spatial
dimensions of their own body is possible by utilizing measure-
ments taken from a standardized photograph of the participant.
We found right-handers to show a spatial asymmetry with respect
to the distance from the midsagittal plane in two out of the three
locations when comparing left- and rightward pointing move-
ments. Their estimate of the narrowest part of their right waist
as well as of the widest part of their right hip was found to be
more distant from the midsagittal plane and importantly closer
to their actual body boundary compared to their estimate of
the left waist and hip. Significant correlations between perfor-
mance on this task and individual participants’ laterality quo-
tients further showed that performance decreased with increasing
dextrality.
Other work showing evidence consistent with the conclu-
sion that right-handers represent body space less precisely than
left-handers includes that of Linkenauger et al. (2009). Accord-
ing to their findings, right-handers significantly overestimate the
length of their right arm and the size of their right hand while
left-handers show no such asymmetry. There is also some evi-
dence of greater areas of somatosensory cortex devoted to the
representation of the right hand in right-handers (Sörös et al.,
1999). However, other studies have failed to replicate this find-
ing (e.g., White et al., 1997; Jung et al., 2003). Nevertheless, there
is the possibility that in addition to less access to, or an overall less
precise, structural representation of the body in right-handers,
there may be more “hardware” devoted to the representation of
the dominant side of the body causing right-handers to show
some asymmetry in judging spatial properties of their own
body.
To summarize the literature reviewed thus far, there is first evi-
dence of laterality effects in the spatial representation of the body
of healthy individuals. Right-handers show a bias not only with
respect to judging external space but also with judging the spa-
tial characteristics of their own body (see Figure 1B), and this
bias is absent in the performance of left-handers. Moreover, the
reported effects relate to an action-oriented moment-to-moment
representation of the spatial properties of our body akin to the
body schema, which may be supported by automatic sensorimo-
tor loops independent of explicit awareness (Paillard et al., 1983;
Paillard, 1999; Rossetti et al., 2005; Gallace and Spence, 2008).
BODY SPACE IN DISEASE
One condition previously mentioned in relation to the mental
representation of space and the spatial representation of abstract
concepts as well as in relation to dysfunctional navigation behav-
ior is that of hemineglect. Hemineglect probably constitutes the
most striking disorder which can result from disruptive perfusion
from the middle cerebral artery. Most commonly, hemineglect
results from right hemispheric infarcts (Bisiach and Vallar, 2000;
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic drawing illustrating the dependency of the
extent of peripersonal and extrapersonal space on body space in
health (A,B), disease (C,D), and during a body illusion (E). (A) The
inner cylinder represents peripersonal space, while the external cylinder
symbolically represents extrapersonal space. The inner arrows symbolize
the dependency of the extent or size of peripersonal space (i.e., the
internal cylinder) on the state of body (space), while outer arrows pointing
from the inner to the outer cylinder symbolize the dependency of the
extent or size of extrapersonal space on the state/size of peripersonal
space. Distorted space perception is illustrated for healthy right-handers
(B), individuals affected by hemispatial neglect (C), individuals effected by
eating disorders on the example of anorexia nervosa (D), and individuals
experiencing a small body illusion (e.g., van der Hoort et al., 2011;
Banakou et al., 2013) (E).
Kerkhoff, 2001), although sporadic reports of left hemispheric
origin also exist (e.g., Peru and Pinna, 1997). In the absence of
sensory deficits, individuals with hemineglect display a decreased
propensity to recognize and act on objects located contralesion-
ally, although implicit recognition may be preserved (Brozzoli
et al., 2006). While most studies concentrate on peri- and extrap-
ersonal space deficits, deficits in the representation of the stroke
patient’s own body have also been reported (Bisiach et al., 1986;
Committeri et al., 2007). In other words, in addition to a deficit
in perceiving extrapersonal space (see Figure 1C), a diminished
perception of the contralesional body half, or somatic neglect, is
present in some cases. First reports of disturbances of this nature
date back as far as the early 1900s (Head and Holmes, 1912; Pick,
1922) but few in-depth reports of this condition have emerged
since.
Somatic neglect describes a complete disregard of the contrale-
sional side of the patient’s body. For example, these patients may
comb their hair, shave or dress only the non-affected right side of
their body (e.g., Bisiach et al., 1986). Measures aimed at detecting
and quantifying these deficits are structured in a similarway in that
they require the patients to perform reaching movements for their
contralesional extremity or the contralesional side of their body
(ReachingTask: Bisiach et al., 1986; Fluff Test: Cocchini et al., 2001;
Comb, Razor and Glasses Test: Zoccolotti and Judica, 1991). When
asked to complete the subjective midsagittal task described above,
a lateral translation to the right is frequently observed (Richard
et al., 2000, 2004a,b; Saj et al., 2006). Overall, however, there has
been a paucity of sensitive tasks, and existing measures are mostly
not part of routine assessment following admission to hospital
with cerebral infarction. For this reason, it is difficult to draw con-
clusions about important questions such as the frequency with
which somatic neglect occurs, the extent to which a decrease in
the awareness of one’s own body space is typically shown, the
duration of this deficit and what impact it has on the patient’s
daily life.
There is also inconclusive literature regarding the association
between somatic or personal neglect and extrapersonal hem-
ineglect. That is, a decrease in the awareness of one’s own
contralesional hemibody may or may not be associated with
neglect of peripersonal and extrapersonal space (Bisiach et al.,
1986; Zoccolotti and Judica, 1991; Beschin and Robertson, 1997;
Ortigue et al., 2006; Committeri et al., 2007). On the whole it
appears that more instances of isolated extrapersonal neglect than
instances of pure somatic neglect have been found, however. The
contradictory state of the literature may, in part, result from the
use of different measures of somatic neglect in different studies
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(Guariglia and Antonucci, 1992), the different levels of severity of
deficit examined or the varying temporal intervals between infarct
and assessment.
Similarly, to date only two studies have examined the effective-
ness of prism adaptation on the extent to which somatic neglect
signs are shown, and their results contradict each other. As part
of this intervention, patients wear prism glasses, which induce
an optical shift. Following an initial adaptation phase during
which pointing movements are performed in a spatially shifted
manner, the oculomotor system resets itself and the patient’s
movements will be adjusted for the optical shift (Luaute et al.,
2006a,b). Short-term use of prisms has been found beneficial
in the treatment of hemineglect, in the amelioration of repre-
sentational neglect (e.g., spatial representation of time; Magnani
et al., 2011) as well as spatial deficits shown in other modalities
including audition (Buxbaum et al., 2004; Hamilton et al., 2008;
Jacquin-Curtois et al., 2010). In a detailed study of the effect
of prism adaptation on different aspects of somatic neglect, an
improvement of tactile performance was found, which resulted
in a significant decline in somatic neglect symptoms on clinical
assessment (Serino et al., 2007). This contrasted with no benefi-
cial effect for proprioceptive and motor symptoms for the same
patients. A smaller,more recent study failed to show any long-term
effect of prism adaptation on personal space representations (Rus-
coni and Carelli, 2012), although follow-up reports are necessary,
as the study sample of this preliminary report only comprised three
patients.
Turning from the behavioral level of description to the func-
tional level, it was noted earlier that traditionally right middle
cerebral artery infarcts have been associated with hemispatial
deficits. Crucially, areas in the vascular territory of the right
middle cerebral artery not only support processing of peri- and
extrapersonal space (Pouget and Driver, 2000; Driver and Vuilleu-
mier, 2001; Husain and Nachev, 2006), but also the representation
of personal or body space (Kinsbourne and Bemporad, 1984;
Colby and Duhamel, 1996; Graziano and Cooke, 2006). On
measures of somatic neglect, cortical areas as disparate as the
supramarginal and post-central gyrus as well as the medial white
matter (Committeri et al., 2007) and the superior temporal gyrus
(Karnath et al., 2004, 2011) may be involved. In addition, personal
neglect may be the result of a functional disconnection between
primary regions for coding proprioceptive and somatosensory
input and regions coding a more abstract spatial representation
of the body (Committeri et al., 2007).
In line with some of these findings, studies that investigate
patients with conditions related to somatic neglect, such as auto-
topagnosia, suggest a key role of the right inferior parietal lobe
(e.g., Ogden, 1985; Sirigu et al., 1991; BuxbaumandCoslett, 2001).
Autotopagnosic patients display a deficit in maintaining spatial
relationships of body parts and make mislocalization errors when
asked to point to specific body parts. Hemianesthesia has also been
reported to occur more frequently following right brain damage
(Sterzi et al., 1993) and anosognosia, a lack of conscious aware-
ness of a deficit often concomitant to hemineglect, is associated
with right parieto-temporal lesions (Orfei et al., 2007). Finally,
somatoparaphrenia, a condition where ownership of individ-
ual limbs is consistently ascribed to somebody else, is typically
associated with right hemispheric damage (Bottini et al., 2002;
Vallar and Ronchi, 2009).
These latter studies are important in providing robust evidence
regarding well-circumscribed areas of the brain, which support
representations of one’s own body. Valuable insight into more the-
oretical questions can also be gained from experimental studies of
individual patients suffering from any of these conditions. A nice
example of this is a study by Fotopoulou et al. (2011) which exam-
ined the performance of two somatoparaphrenic patients before
and after mirror box therapy. Therapy was successful in tran-
siently reinstating limb ownership when a third person perspective
was experimentally induced, but this was not accompanied by
an improvement of somatoparaphrenia symptoms beyond the
experimental session. Both patients showed extensive damage
encompassingmost of the right parietal and temporal lobes, which
does not allow any precise conclusions about the exact networks
supporting limb ownership. However, the results crucially suggest
that body ownership is largely driven by an egocentric representa-
tion of the body (Blanke et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007b; Petkova
et al., 2011).
Relatedly, it has been proposed that allocentric, or viewer-
invariant, neglect always occurs concomitant to egocentric neglect
(Grunwald et al., 2001; Rorden et al., 2012). That is, aside from
the question of which regions of space are affected separately or in
combination by hemineglect (i.e., somatic neglect with or without
extrapersonal neglect), patients showing deficits in recognizing
target objects on the left side of the page (egocentric neglect) often
also show deficits in recognizing individual targets if the defining
feature is on the left side of the target object, regardless of the loca-
tion in which it is presented in egocentric coordinates (allocentric
or object-based neglect). Although this may depend on the exact
nature of the search task and the characteristics of the stimuli (see
Gainotti and Ciaraffa, 2013 for a dissociative account of ego- and
allocentric neglect), it may be deduced that the ability to recognize
and process external objects as a whole from one’s own perspec-
tive contributes to a representation of the same object in a manner
that is separate from that perspective. Similarly, the representation
of our own body from our perspective is the most immediate and
private representation of space, and this representationmay enable
us to not only construct an allocentric model of our own body, but
also a model of space outside of our own body (see Figure 1A). As
shown above, higher-order deficits, such as extrapersonal neglect
or somatoparaphrenia, can frequently result from a difficulty in
synthesizing the lower-order moment-to-moment representation
of one’s own body with the representation of external spatial cues
as well as the visual/external cues about the spatial properties of
one’s own body.
A second example of a well-known set of disorders which affect
the spatial representation of one’s own body is that of eating dis-
orders. In contrast to somatic neglect and some of the related
syndromes described above, it is usually assumed that, in eating
disorders, the body image is affected (e.g., Kinsbourne and Bem-
porad, 1984). As a result of a negative evaluation of their ownbody,
individuals with eating disorders go to extreme lengths to alter the
appearance of their body. Disturbances of the body image aremost
frequently assessed using questionnaires and tests that tap into the
conscious and emotional evaluation of body space. For example,
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Hennighausen and Remschmidt’s (1999) Computer Body Image
Test contains partly distorted individual body outlines, generated
by the tracing of a photograph of the patient’s body. The patient
is then asked to adjust the body outline according to the estimated
true size of his or her body outline. This test can be regarded
as an explicit measure of how body space is represented in the
sense that it requires a memory-based recall of the spatial dimen-
sions of one’s own body that is independent of direct primary
somatosensory inputs due to movement.
Nonetheless, the body image also constitutes a kind of struc-
tural and geometric representation of the body. That is, the
body image is principally dependent on and influenced by pri-
mary somatosensory inputs (cf. e.g., Lackner, 1988; Gandevia
and Phegan, 1999; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009a). This is espe-
cially true during development. More recent investigations of
participants with a history of eating disorders have begun to
acknowledge this interdependency and include tests of primary
sensory and motor representations of the body. As a result, it
is now known that individuals with anorexia nervosa perform
more poorly on tests requiring the integration of primary sen-
sory input with external spatial reference frames. Marked deficits
have been reported for the haptic reproduction of random shapes
(Grunwald et al., 2001) and for the alignment of the subjective ver-
tical with the external reference frame (Guardia et al., 2013), for
instance.
Individuals with anorexia nervosa also show deficits in tasks
assessing their ability to perform motor imagery. In a study by
Guardia et al. (2012), anorexia nervosa patients and a group of
control participants were required to perform a task similar to the
navigation and handedness studies summarized above. A naviga-
tional display containing a doorway of varying size was presented.
Instead of navigating through the doorway, participants remained
at a fixed distance to the display and had to judge whether or
not they could fit through without turning sideways (first-person
condition). In an additional condition, the same judgment had
to be made about the experimenter standing in the same posi-
tion as the participant for the first-person judgment (third-person
condition). There was a significant difference between first- and
third-person perspectives only for participants with a history of
anorexia nervosa. These patients overestimated the dimensions of
their own, but not the experimenter’s body, relative to the doorway.
Importantly, this difference was not due to decreased perceptual
discriminability in the patient group.
These findings are consistent with a number of other reports
showing a lesser ability of anorexic participants to directly, or
indirectly, estimate their body boundaries (see Figure 1D). For
example, Christman et al. (2007a; see also Niebauer et al., 2002)
found a significant correlation between the absolute value of hand-
edness and the discrepancy between actual and estimated body
mass index (BMI): the greater the degree of right-handedness,
the greater the discrepancy between the true and estimated BMI.
The authors suggested that greater lateralization in right-handers
leads to diminished access to right hemisphere processing and,
as a result, to an impoverished representation of the body.
Similarly, in an indirect measure of body boundaries, Nico
et al. (2010) found anorexic patients to be less accurate in their
estimation of the width of their left upper body. Crucially,
performance of anorexia nervosa patients was comparable to
that of a group of participants with a history of right parietal
lesions.
Finally, a few studies have investigated body representation
in individuals with eating disorders with the use of the RHI
paradigm. A summary of the experimental procedure typically
employed for this illusion will be given below. For the moment,
it is sufficient to say that the illusion critically involves a com-
parison of the experimentally manipulated tactile and visual
information with the proprioceptive information about the posi-
tion of one’s own hand. Since the representation of the hand is
not usually a focus of body concerns or emotional biases, this
illusion is arguably better-suited to the study of body aware-
ness in individuals with eating disorders compared to any of
the paradigms mentioned above (Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009b).
Eshkevari et al. (2012) and, prior to that, Mussap and Salton
(2006) found a relationship between the extent of psychopathol-
ogy and the strength of the illusion. Specifically for the former,
nearly a quarter of the variance in the strength with which the
illusion was felt was explained by interoceptive deficits and self-
objectification. Participants with increased scores on interoceptive
items (e.g., “I don’t know what is going on inside me.”) of the
Eating Disorder Inventory and increased scores on a self-report
assessment of self-objectification showed a greater behavioral
effect of the illusion (i.e., greater proprioceptive drift). In sum,
studies examining the susceptibility of individuals to the RHI
are consistent with the theory of right hemispheric dysregula-
tion and resulting body spatial deficits in individuals with eating
disorders.
ILLUSORY BODY SPACE
The use of illusory paradigms to study body awareness has a long
tradition, particularly in the literature examining neurologically
healthy individuals. These studies typically create a mismatch or
dissonance between the sensory modalities, and capture partic-
ipants’ responses both on a qualitative or subjective level (with
the use of questionnaires) and a quantitative level (an objec-
tively measurable effect such as the displacement of a body part).
Somatosensory illusions provide an excellent demonstration of the
malleability of the boundary between external and body space.
In other words, what is experienced as embodied space at one
moment becomes disembodied as a result of the illusion being
induced a moment later (see also Holmes and Spence, 2006
for the concept of excorporation). And the reverse is true as
well, with external space transforming into embodied space (i.e.,
incorporation).
The RHI constitutes one of the most widely used examples of
perceptual illusions employed to study aspects of body represen-
tation, body awareness, and body ownership. The typical set-up
includes a screen which conceals one of the participant’s hands
and forearm from their view, a prosthetic (rubber) hand, which
is placed in an anatomically plausible position to the participant’s
body (cf. Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005) and a set of stroking devices. In a block-wise fashion, the
participant’s concealed hand and the prosthetic hand are stroked
in a synchronous or asynchronous manner. While synchronous
stroking induces a displacement of the tactile stimulation toward
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the location of the prosthetic hand (i.e., the illusion of the tactile
sensation originating from the seen rather than the felt posi-
tion), asynchronous stroking does not usually produce such a
displacement. Both horizontal and vertical experimental set-ups
have been used to successfully evoke displacement in the left–
right and up–down direction, respectively (Haggard and Jundi,
2009; Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2012). Participants’ responses are
measured with regard to the phenomenological experience of
ownership over the prosthetic hand (Longo et al., 2008), and with
respect to sensory aspects of the illusion such as the degree of
displacement (also commonly termed proprioceptive drift).
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the spatial nature of the illu-
sion and the involvement of representations of the body, it has
repeatedly been shown that extensive right hemispheric networks
appear to support the illusion. Converging evidence from func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS), and lesion studies point toward the temporo-
parietal junction (Tsakiris et al., 2008), inferior parietal lobule
(Kammers et al., 2008), posterior insula (Tsakiris et al., 2007a),
and ventral premotor and cerebellar areas (Ehrsson et al., 2004,
2005; Zeller et al., 2011) as contributing to some aspects of the
illusion.
While it may be said that due to their exclusive focus on
representations of the hand, RHI findings are limited in the con-
clusions that can be drawn about representations of the body as
a whole, other studies have successfully created the illusion of
incorporating a foreign body using a similar tactile stimulation
procedure (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Petkova and Ehrs-
son, 2008). It is also known that there are varying degrees to
which participants perceive this type of illusion and a certain
percentage of people from the general population (also called
“non-perceivers” in contrast to “perceivers”) appear to be some-
what immune to the illusion. Research into individual differences
in susceptibility to this and other somatosensory illusions is
only starting to emerge, but it is this work which may be par-
ticularly interesting with regard to the laterality aspect of the
illusion.
One of the first studies to examine individual differences in
the RHI is that by Niebauer et al. (2002). The authors compared
the susceptibility of strong right-handers with that of less strongly
right-handed participants. Remarkably, it was found that the latter
group reported a stronger experience and a tendency to a faster
onset of the illusionary experience of incorporating a prosthetic
hand into their body schema. The authors proposed that due to the
assumed greater right hemisphere access, the less strongly handed
were more “efficiently” able to update their body representation
and thus experience the illusion to a greater extent.
Another recent exception to the lack of studies examining
individual differences contributing to the extent to which sen-
sory illusions are experienced is that by Tsakiris et al. (2011). The
objective of this study was to determine the extent to which inte-
roceptive abilities affect the integration of multiple sources of
sensory information about the body. Similar to the studies exam-
ining participants with eating disorders cited above, Tsakiris et al.
(2011) found that low interoceptive ability was associated with
a stronger illusion generally and, more specifically, with greater
proprioceptive drift, greater reduction in skin temperature of
participant’s own hand and greater feelings of ownership over the
rubber hand. The authors conclude that the differential weighting
of internal and external sources of information about the state
of the body underlies the difference in susceptibility to the RHI.
Greater weighting of right-hemispheric internal signals (Craig,
2002) may lead to a decrease in the extent to which the illusion
is perceived. Unfortunately, no information about the laterality of
the participants included in this study was given, and, at present,
there are no investigations of the relationship between the degree
of lateralization and interoceptive ability.
Finally, a study by Ocklenburg et al. (2010, p. 180) showed
greater skin conductance response to a threat to the left hand
as well as “a stronger subjective identification with the rubber
hand on the left side” following the induction of the RHI com-
pared to the response of the right hand. Interestingly, more recent
work by the same group has shown that individuals affected by
chronic regional pain syndrome, a condition characterized by
unilateral deficient perception of static tactile stimuli, show a
similar laterality effect (Reinersmann et al., 2013). Left-affected
individuals reported a stronger RHI on their left hand com-
pared to right-affected individuals. Furthermore, a significant
negative correlation between the time passed since the onset of
the disease and the strength of the illusion was only found for
left-affected individuals. However, there is substantial clinical
heterogeneity in chronic regional pain syndrome and bilateral
cortical reorganization has also been reported (Marinus et al.,
2011). Therefore, these latter findings will need to be interpreted
cautiously.
Consistent with Ocklenburg et al.’s (2011) finding of an
enhanced RHI for the left hand, it has also been found that
neurologically healthy right-handers are particularly receptive to
spontaneous sensations for their left hand compared to their right
hand (Michael et al., 2012). In this last study, there was a signifi-
cant difference between the left and right hand in the number of
different spontaneous sensations (e.g., beat/pulse, tickle) reported
after a ten second block as well as their intensity and spatial extent.
Furthermore, visual attention modulated the effect spatially, by
shifting the spontaneous sensations more distally (i.e., from the
palm to the fingertips). Together the RHI and the spontaneous
sensation finding suggest that the right hemisphere gives rise to a
representation of the sensations arising from the left body half that
is updated at a higher rate compared to tactile and visual signals
from the right body half arriving at the left hemisphere. Both the
weighting of internal to external signals within these representa-
tions of the right and left body half, and the weighting of right
and left hemispheric contributions to the moment-to-moment
representation of the body on the whole may contribute to indi-
vidual differences in susceptibility to illusory percepts such as
the RHI.
In summary, perceptual illusions pertaining to representations
of the body are important in supplementing findings from the
clinical literature because they enable the examination of intact
systems in the healthy brain and body. They further illustrate the
flexible boundary between what is perceived as part of our own
body and that which is perceived as outside of our own body
by inducing illusory shifts causing incorporation of space out-
side of the body and excorporation of body space. The RHI is
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thus inherently spatial, acting on body location. A growing body
of research shows that right hemispheric networks support the
induction of the RHI and that individuals with a lower degree of
lateralization are more susceptible to the illusion. Further, there
is some evidence that individuals with low interoceptive abilities
may experience the RHI more easily and vividly.
CONCLUSION
An ever-increasing amount of literature documents laterality
effects with regard to space in vision (e.g., Brodie and Dunn,
2005; Cocchini et al., 2007), audition (e.g., Ocklenburg et al.,
2010), the mental representation of numbers and the alphabet
(e.g., Oliveri et al., 2004; Nicholls et al., 2008a) and even seem-
ingly mundane tasks including Likert scale responses (Nicholls
et al., 2006). Even though the hemispatial bias resulting from lat-
eralization is small in magnitude in any one of these instances,
its omnipresence means that the consequences are far-reaching.
While external spatial representation has long been recognized
as a lateralized system and many theories have been proposed as
to the mechanism by which this division of function occurred
(for some examples, see Davidson and Hugdahl, 2002), the spatial
representationof abstract concepts and spatial representations cre-
ated by modalities other than vision have only recently warranted
attention.
Here, we summarized evidence from three different areas of
body space literature which shows that laterality is a principle
that governs the multimodal processing of this region of space
also. Specifically, first evidence of right-hemispheric dominance
for spatial body representations was shown to exist for simple, pri-
mary sensory representations of body space such as those utilized
during pointing movements to one’s own body and those at play
in body illusions like the RHI, as well as more complex spatial rep-
resentations of one’s own body such as the distorted body space
in individuals with eating disorders. It appears, therefore, that
despite constituting a richer and more immediate spatial repre-
sentation through the additional interoceptive component and the
inescapable first-person perspective, body space is equivalent to
external space in the sense of being supported by right-lateralized
networks.
From the above observations we conclude the present review by
proposing a working hypothesis stating that rather than many dif-
ferent spatial systems for different purposes, one main system may
exist which allows for the action-oriented representation of one’s
own body and the parts of the external spatial world on which the
action could potentially be applied. In other words, it may be most
parsimonious and computationally efficient (see Gotts et al., 2013
for a summary of a similar argument regarding a computational
benefit of lateralization) to possess one system for the processing
of spatial information as a whole, be it for navigating from one side
of the room to the other and avoiding collisions between one’s own
body and objects in the path, estimating the dimensions of a cup
in relation to the size of one’s own hand in order to grasp it or
reaching for an itch on the back of the neck. Furthermore, it could
be argued that due to the immediacy of spatial representations of
one’s own body, it is this representation that forms the vantage
point for the perception of the world. In other words, not only
might the size of one’s neck determine what is perceived as in or
outside of the wood, but the spatial representation of our own
body may serve as the template for representing external (peri-
and extrapersonal) space (see Figure 1A).
A related hypothesis commonly summarized under the heading
of “embodied perception” similarly emphasizes the interdepen-
dency between the perception of the external world and the state
of the perceiver’s body (for a summary of prominent accounts, see,
for example, Sebanz and Knoblich, 2010). For example, a widely
cited piece of empirical evidence for this hypothesis is that the
slope of a hill is apparently estimated as steeper by a metaboli-
cally challenged perceiver (who may be tired or may carry a heavy
weight on their back) compared to a perceiver in a metabolically
“neutral” state (Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999). While this account is
complementary to the hypothesis forwarded as part of the present
review, specifically with regard to metric representations of the
body and their influence on the representation of the size of the
environment (e.g., Linkenauger et al., 2011), two main differences
exist. First,most theorizing thatmay be subsumedunder the head-
ing of embodied perception does not include a discussion of what
the body itself constitutes (Proffitt and Linkenauger, 2013). Here,
we conceptualize the body as a region of space and propose that
the processing of this space may underlie similar principles as the
processing of external space. Second, as evident from the example
given above, the majority of the embodied perception literature
is concerned with the influence of (the state of) the body on the
visual perception of the world (e.g., Proffitt, 2013). We, in contrast,
emphasize the importance of multisensory cues in the perception
of body space and external space.
Support for the hypothesis of body space acting as a tem-
plate for the action-oriented perception of external space can be
found in the developmental trajectory of body and external spa-
tial awareness, or the order in which these functions are acquired.
For example, while children as young as 5 months can differen-
tiate between the spatial pattern of self-produced movement and
movement produced by another child (Schmuckler and Fairhall,
2001), depth perception and allocentric spatial encoding do not
develop until children reach the toddling stage (e.g., Kermoian
and Campos, 1988). Children who experience a developmental
delay also often display deficits in spatial orientation, but no such
deficits are present for the spatial representation of their own body
(Herman and Siegel, 1978). Finally, (developmental) Gerstmann’s
syndrome is characterized not only by finger agnosia, but also
by left–right disorientation and acalculia (Vallar, 2007; Rusconi
et al., 2010) and may represent an instance where a deficit in the
egocentric spatial representation (i.e., one’s own hands) leads to
difficulties in higher-order spatial representations (i.e., numbers)
through the process of counting by using one’s own hands, for
example.
Returning to the examples of body space lateralization given in
the preceding review, findings from the literature on hemispatial
neglect are also congruent with the conjecture advanced here. As
outlined above, hemispatial deficits of personal and extrapersonal
space often occur together (e.g., Rorden et al., 2012). Importantly,
isolated personal space deficits are rare, while instances of isolated
deficits in extrapersonal space have been reported more often. The
example of distorted space in individuals with eating disorders
may similarly be interpreted as evidence of the inter-relatedness of
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personal and external spatial representations, where distortions in
the egocentric representation of body space may result in external
spatial deficits downstream (see Figure 1D). Finally, body space
illusions, such as the RHI and related phenomena, most strikingly
the embodiment of a whole body of the other gender (Petkova
et al., 2011) and of a child’s body (Banakou et al., 2013), nicely
illustrate the automaticity and impenetrability with which self-
attribution takes place (Jeannerod, 2003). In the case of visual,
tactile, and proprioceptive information arriving from roughly the
same location in space, it appears that the representation of one’s
own body is adjusted to that location, and importantly, represen-
tations of external space are calibrated to it. For example, external
objects appear to shrink in the face of an embodied large hand
(Haggard and Jundi, 2009) or to grow in the face of illusory own-
ership over a small body (van der Hoort et al., 2011; Banakou et al.,
2013; see Figure 1E for a schematic illustration of the scaling of
peri- and extrapersonal space following the illusory embodiment
of a small body).
In sum, we show hemispheric asymmetries to be evident in
body representations at increasing levels of complexity from sim-
ple somatosensory and proprioceptive representations to higher-
order representations. It should be noted that the examples of
anorexia nervosa and the RHI reviewed here were selected due to
the relatively high number of empirical studies examining these
with regard to laterality. Many other conditions which may serve
as examples of changes in body spatial representations (e.g., body
dysmorphic disorder) could be equally informative here but were
outside of the scope of this review. Based on findings from devel-
opmental, clinical, and experimental neuroscience, we propose the
working hypothesis that spatial representations of one’s own body
may not only determine what is within one’s reach or within one’s
neck of the woods, but serve as a basis for the action-oriented
spatial perception of peri- and extrapersonal space. Related to
higher cognitive functions, this may be interpreted more broadly
as representations of the bodily self-constituting a template for
representations of the external world.
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